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SOLIDIFYING ARKANSAS’S LIQUIDATED DAMAGE LAW AFTER S.O.G.-SAN 
ORE-GARDNER V. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.: IT’S NOT ALL WATER 
UNDER THE BRIDGE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Railroads once symbolized wealth, political power, and the industriali-
zation of the United States. During the late nineteenth century, many states’ 
economic structures began to change as a result of railroad construction and 
industrial development.1 Railroad growth into new geographic areas helped 
revolutionize agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation.2 As part of that 
growth, expanding railroad infrastructure played a significant role in the 
economic development of the United States. Around 1900, more miles of 
rail were laid down in a ten-year span than the preceding one hundred years 
combined.3 That grand effort necessarily kept contractors busy building 
bridges, tunnels, and other forms of infrastructure ancillary to actual rail 
installation. 
Even as passenger travel via rail waned in the twentieth century, by 
1970, rail freight was consistently setting usage records; “[b]etween 1970 
and 2000, rail freight [usage] doubled.”4 Just like the boom at turn of the 
twentieth century, this increase in rail freight also led to increased infra-
structure construction—some of which took place in Arkansas. Looking at 
the Benzal Bridge over the White River, it is easy to imagine the positive 
financial impact building the bridge had on that part of rural Arkansas. The 
image of this economic blessing makes it hard to believe that constructing 
that bridge would result in years of litigation.5 The most damaging aspect of 
this litigation is that it yielded a rule of law that was one of the worst things 
to happen to Arkansas construction law in the past three decades. 
Rooted in the “fundamental principal of freedom of contract,” parties 
have been free to negotiate specific or liquidated sums and contractually 
bind themselves to those sums as a basis of damages for breach of contract 
actions.6 Typically, these liquidated damage provisions are included where 
  
 1. See James Logan Hunt, Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law and Politi-
cal Change in Nineteenth-Century North Carolina, 66 N.C. L. REV. 421, 434 (1988). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. American Railroads in the 20th Century, NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HISTORY, 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/onthemove/themes/story_42_1.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). 
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 65.1, at 213 (4th ed. 1993). 
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actual damages “are by their nature uncertain and difficult to determine.”7 
From a court’s standpoint, actual cost information is always preferable to 
estimates when establishing damages.8 Courts will uphold liquidated dam-
age provisions only if they pass the most exacting judicial scrutiny.9 
Judicial scrutiny is not limited to an inquiry of whether a liquidated 
damage provision bears some relationship to the actual damages that may 
flow from a breach. A second potential issue comes to life where one party 
has contributed to a breach yet still seeks to enforce a damage provision 
against the other party. State laws vary on this issue.10 The traditional view 
leads courts to opt against enforcement, whereas the modern view will ap-
portion fault and enforce the provision accordingly.11 This approach of di-
viding the fault is commonly known as the apportionment rule.12 
Jurisdictions opposing the apportionment rule must face problems with 
which their counterparts need not be concerned. First, refusing to apportion 
damages contravenes public policy. Nearly all state legislatures have en-
  
 7. 1 HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAW OF DAMAGES § 8.1, at 99 
(5th ed. 2004). Though the language of liquidated damage provisions often varies from con-
tract to contract, the spirit of them remains the same. In the internet age we live in, parties to 
construction contracts are increasingly using electronic versions of American Institute of 
Architects (AIA) contract documents. See WERNER SABO, LEGAL GUIDE TO AIA DOCUMENTS, 
at vii (5th ed. 2008). A variation on an AIA liquidated damage provision may read as fol-
lows: 
 
8.3.1.1 Failure to Complete the Work on Time. It is mutually agreed by and be-
tween the parties hereto that time shall be an essential part of this contract and 
that if the Contractor fails to complete its contract within the time specified and 
agreed upon, the Owner will be damaged thereby; and because the amount of 
said damages, inclusive of expenses for inspection, superintendence, and neces-
sary traveling expenses, is difficult if not impossible to definitely ascertain and 
prove, it is hereby agreed that the amount of such damages shall be the appropri-
ate sum set forth below in the Schedule of Liquidated Damages as liquidated 
damages for every working day’s delay in finishing the work in excess of the 
number of working days prescribed; and the Contractor hereby agrees that said 
sum shall be deducted from monies due the Contractor under the contract or, if 
no money is due the Contractor, the Contractor hereby agrees to pay to the 
Owner as liquidated damages, and not by way of penalty, such total sum as shall 
be due for such delay, computed aforesaid. 
 
Id. § 5.47, at 619 (adapting a liquidated damage provision in a case before the Hawaii Su-
preme Court) (citing Associated Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc. v. State, 567 P.2d 397 (Haw. 
1977)). 
 8. See LYNN R. AXELROTH ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRUCTION LAW 250–51 
(Carina Y. Enhada et al. eds., 2001). 
 9. See 1 BRILL, supra note 7, § 8.1, at 99–100. 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. E.g., PCL Constr. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 479, 487 (2002). 
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acted portions of the Uniform Commercial Code and comparative fault stat-
utes that operate analogously to the apportionment theory.13 Second, refus-
ing to apportion damages creates a conflict with the fundamental freedom to 
contract. Sophisticated parties to a commercial contract allocate risk using 
various contract provisions—including liquidated damages.14 Third, refusing 
to apportion merely prolongs litigation. Courts falsely cite undue hardship 
and judicial inefficiency as reasons against apportioning liquidated damages. 
However, when courts refuse to apportion, parties continue to pursue litiga-
tion—then, the fact-finder shoulders the entire burden of ascertaining dam-
ages due without the benefit of using a contractually agreed-upon basis.15 
This note argues that the Eighth Circuit’s holding in S.O.G.-San Ore-
Gardner v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.16 is bad law because the court 
concluded that any act contributing to the failure to meet contractual dead-
lines, notwithstanding a disproportionate level of corresponding fault, bars 
parties from enforcing a liquidated damage provision. First, this note will 
discuss the development of liquidated damage law in the United States, in-
cluding the apportionment rule. Next, it will illustrate problems that arise 
when a court rejects the apportionment rule. Finally, it will propose that 
Arkansas adopt the apportionment rule and provides justifications for that 
adoption. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of Liquidated Damage Law 
Distinguishing the differences in liquidated damages and penalties is 
critical, for these differences help highlight the underlying policies and con-
troversies surrounding liquidated damage law. Liquidated damages are fixed 
sums that contracting parties agree to pay if they later break a contractual 
obligation.17 Those agreed-upon sums must have been determined as a result 
of a good faith effort to estimate actual damages that were likely to follow a 
breach.18 When parties do not estimate actual damages and instead designate 
a sum likely to prevent a breach, that sum will be deemed a penalty.19 
  
 13. See infra Part III.A.1–2. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. 658 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (9th ed. 2009). Liquidated damages are also referred 
to as stipulated damages. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981). 
 19. Id. 
392 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
1. Historical Background 
Litigating to determine damages is an expensive and cumbersome 
process.20 As a result, contracting parties have long stated remedies for 
breaching their agreement prior to contract formation rather than vesting the 
responsibility with a judge or, perhaps even less reassuring for some parties, 
a jury.21 In England, until the late eighteenth century, courts of law and eq-
uity freely conceded the “power of binding oneself to pay any sum one was 
willing to assume” for failing to perform an obligation.22 Near the turn of 
that century, the judiciary began disfavoring such agreements.23 Courts be-
came wary of “the unusual danger of oppressive and extortionate bar-
gains.”24 As time progressed, however, the concept of allowing parties to 
allocate risk by stipulating damages for breach took hold, albeit in a very 
small way, in English common law tradition.25 “[I]t came to be recognized 
that promises to pay money as recompense for future defaults which could 
not be exactly valued were legitimate expedients for avoiding the uncer-
tainty of a jury’s finding and should be enforced.”26 
Around 1835, English and American courts began selectively enforcing 
liquidated damage provisions where they clearly bore some rational rela-
tionship to actual damages that might flow as a result of a breach.27 When 
any uncertainty arose as to whether the breach was meant to be addressed by 
the provision, those early courts tended to hold the provision to be an unen-
forceable penalty.28 If the parties limited the scope of the liquidated damage 
  
 20. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Foreword, Power, Inequality, and the Bargain: The Role of 
Bargaining Power in the Law of Contract—Symposium Introduction, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
841, 845 (2006). 
 21. See 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 58.1, at 395–96 (rev. ed. 2005). 
 22. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 147, at 601 
(1935). 
 23. See id. Disfavor from United States courts can be seen from decisions as early as the 
mid-nineteenth century. See 11 PERILLO, supra note 21, § 58.4, at 413. 
 24. See MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 147, at 600. These oppressive tactics largely 
resulted from the enforcement of creditors’ penal bonds against vulnerable debtors beguiled 
by illusions of hope. See, e.g., 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 6, § 65:4, at 253–55. 
 25. See Kemble v. Farren, (1829) 130 Eng. Rep. 1234, 1236–37 (C.P.); 6 Bing. 140, 
147–49 (discussing a liquidated damage provision in an employment contract). The court 
illustrated the limited nature of enforceable liquidated damage clauses by approving en-
forcement where “an agreement fixes that which is almost impossible to be accurately ascer-
tained,” but declining to do so when the clause “extends to the breach of any stipulation by 
either party.” Id. at 1237; 6 Bing. at 148 (emphasis added). 
 26. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 147, at 602. 
 27. See id. at 603. 
 28. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 119 (1907). 
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provision to a genuinely unascertainable injury, however, courts were much 
more likely to enforce those provisions.29 
2. Current State of the Law 
In Arkansas, before a court will uphold a liquidated damage provision, 
it will determine whether the contracting parties contemplated that damages 
would result from nonperformance, the damages would otherwise be diffi-
cult or impossible to calculate with precision, and the agreed-upon sum is 
proportional to the non-performance damages originally contemplated.30 
Failing to meet all three conditions precludes enforcement.31 Although out-
side the construction context, an opinion issued by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court illustrates a detailed application of the three-pronged rule.32 
Identifying whether contracting parties contemplated damages flowing 
from a breach is generally self-explanatory. In Alley v. Rodgers, sellers 
brought an action against the estate of a deceased buyer, seeking to enforce 
a provision in a contract for sale of three mobile homes.33 On appeal from a 
jury verdict for the sellers, the Arkansas Supreme Court analyzed the valid-
ity of the liquidated damage provision.34 In the first prong of the analysis, 
the court plainly stated that “here the parties recognized damages would 
flow from a breach of the contract.”35 The only language available for the 
court to infer contemplation of damages in the event of a failure to perform 
came from the contract itself: “[Buyer] agrees that down payment is to be 
considered as earnest money and liquidated damages should [Buyer] not 
complete the terms of the contract.”36 Satisfied that the parties contemplated 
damages, the court next moved to the second prong.37 
Determining the difficulty of ascertaining damages flowing from a 
breach of contract requires more analysis than the first prong of the enforce-
able liquidated damage test. The Alley court answered this question using 
facts outside the contract language.38 Prior to entering into the contract for 
sale, the sellers rented two of the mobile homes that were to be sold.39 Once 
  
 29. See, e.g., Kemble, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1237; 6 Bing. at 148 (declining to enforce a 
liquidated damage clause that purported to apply to all breaches). 
 30. Alley v. Rodgers, 269 Ark. 262, 264, 599 S.W.2d 739, 741 (1980); see also Wel-
bourn v. Kee, 134 Ark. 361, 204 S.W. 220 (1918); AXELROTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 261. 
 31. See, e.g., Welbourn, 134 Ark. at 361, 204 S.W. at 220. 
 32. See Alley, 269 Ark. at 262, 599 S.W.2d at 739. 
 33. Id. at 263–64, 599 S.W.2d at 740. 
 34. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 740. 
 35. Id. at 264, 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 36. Id. at 263, 599 S.W.2d at 740. 
 37. See id. at 264–65, 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 38. See Alley, 269 Ark. at 264–65, 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 39. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
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the sellers executed the contract, they ordered the tenants to vacate,40 discon-
tinued all advertising, and turned away other prospective buyers.41 Predict-
ing the exact amount of damages flowing from a breach would have been 
difficult to determine. Neither the buyer nor the sellers could accurately 
predict how long it would take to sell the mobile homes in the event of a 
breach.42 How could “the parties . . . estimate without some difficulty the 
potential loss of rental income?”43 This difficulty in estimation sufficiently 
warranted the court’s enforcement of the liquidated damage provision—so 
long as the sellers were able to meet one last condition. 
The final step in determining whether a liquidated damage provision is 
enforceable hinges on the provision’s sum bearing a reasonable proportion 
to what the parties contemplated might flow from a breach.44 The Alley court 
reached a conclusion by merely interjecting figures into its previous second 
prong analysis.45 Here, the sellers had rented two of the trailers for $140 
each per month.46 “At a combined rental income of $280 per month, seven 
months’ vacancy would have resulted in an approximate loss of $2000,” 
which was the liquidated damage sum.47 On these facts, the court found a 
connection between the provision and the actual damages that could flow 
from breaching the contract for sale. 
Failing to satisfy any of the three prongs of the enforceable liquidated 
damage test will deem the provision a penalty—rendering it unenforceable. 
This test is designed to ferret out the true intent of the parties’ purpose for 
including a provision. The courts’ process of determining intent in this con-
text is similar to applying contract interpretation principles. If at all possible, 
courts will effectuate the mutual intent of the parties.48 Though form and 
language of the contract will also be considered, language alone is not dis-
  
 40. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 41. See id. at 265, 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 42. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 741. The court also considered it likely that the number of poten-
tial offers would be reduced based on the sellers’ attempts to bundle three mobile homes in 
one sale. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 43. Id. at 265, 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 44. Note that 
 
[t]his last qualification is important, since in many cases at the time of the breach 
it is apparent that the liquidated damages rate is too high or too low in relation to 
the owner’s actual damages. The owner in fact may have no actual damages at all 
stemming from the delayed completion. 
 
AXELROTH ET AL., supra note 8, at 263. 
 45. See Alley, 269 Ark. at 265, 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 46. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 47. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 741. 
 48. See McIlvenny v. Horton, 227 Ark. 826, 829, 302 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1957); Reed v. 
Wright, 270 Ark. 45, 51, 603 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980). 
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positive.49 Inclusion of the words liquidated damages or penal sum are not 
controlling.50 Additionally, any ambiguity “will be resolved against the 
[party] whose form was used.”51 If a liquidated damage provision is deemed 
enforceable, it is necessary to inquire into each individual party’s fault. 
B. Development of the Apportionment Rule 
Apportionment is the idea that a party seeking to enforce a liquidated 
damage provision may only recover such damages for which it is not pro-
portionally responsible.52 As early as 1883, United States courts recognized 
apportionment as an appropriate means of addressing liability for parties’ 
mutual construction delay.53 At the time, however, the idea was a significant 
departure from English common law and only adopted by a few jurisdic-
tions.54 
Historically, courts resisted apportionment because of “early judicial 
hostility to the use of privately agreed upon contract damage remedies.”55 
This and other underlying policies have eroded over time, resulting in wide-
spread acceptance of apportionment in many jurisdictions.56 Today, nearly 
  
 49. See Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927); Johnson v. Jones, 33 
Ark. App. 149, 152, 807 S.W.2d 39, 42 (1991). 
 50. See In re Lammers, 211 F. Supp. 448, 449 (E.D. Ark. 1962) (use of “liquidated 
damages” not controlling); Lasater v. W. Clay Drainage Dist., 177 Ark. 997, 8 S.W.2d 502, 
503 (1928) (parties’ intention is controlling); Montague v. Robinson, 122 Ark. 163, 163, 182 
S.W. 558, 559 (1916) (use of “penal sum” not controlling). 
 51. Hall v. Weeks, 214 Ark. 703, 707, 217 S.W.2d 828, 830 (1949). 
 52. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 116. 
 53. See Tex. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Rust, 19 F. 239 (E.D. Ark. 1883). Interestingly enough, 
Rust bore a strong resemblance to San Ore-Gardner. In Rust, a railroad sued a contractor for 
breaching a contract to construct a railroad bridge across the Arkansas River. Id. at 239. After 
completing the enforceable liquidated damage provision analysis, the court held that “[i]f the 
plaintiff directed the defendants to . . . do work on the bridge not covered by the contract, . . . 
then it must be implied that both parties consented to such an extension of time as was neces-
sary or reasonable for making such . . . changes.” Id. at 245 (citing Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
84 U.S. 592 (1873)). In Rust, “the time at which the [stipulated sum] was to commence to 
accrue under the contract would be postponed” by whatever additional duration the agreed to 
change would have taken to complete. Id. 
 54. See J.E. Macy, Annotation, Liability of Building or Construction Contractor for 
Liquidated Damages for Breach of Time Limit Where Work Is Delayed by Contractee or 
Third Person, 152 A.L.R. 1349 (1944). 
 55. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1038–39 (5th Cir. 
1977) (citing Mosler Safe Co. v. Maiden Lane Safe Deposit Co., 93 N.E. 81, 83 (N.Y. 1910)) 
(“While such an agreement has not the harshness of a penalty, it is, nevertheless, in its nature, 
such that its enforcement, where the party claiming the right to enforce has, in part, been the 
cause of delay, would be unjust.”). 
 56. See Macy, supra note 54, at 1349. Though the differences in the effects of all appor-
tionment theories appear to be negligible, upon closer review, the subtle nuances of each 
variation may seem confusing. One approach may be to extend the term of the contract based 
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all jurisdictions adhere to one of three prevailing rules that address appor-
tionment. 
The traditional view is one of no-apportionment. Jurisdictions follow-
ing this rule will not enforce a liquidated damage provision when the party 
seeking enforcement has contributed to the delay.57 An early line of cases 
illustrating the rule’s development begins with Weeks v. Little,58 an 1882 
New York case. In Weeks, the New York Court of Appeals found no merit 
in a contractor’s argument that its delay was caused by the delay of another 
contractor working for the same owner.59 The court refused to enforce the 
provision, stating that it could not divide and apportion the fault.60 The New 
York line continued to develop, with Mosler Safe Co. v. Maiden Lane Safe 
Deposit Co.61 marking the significant shift into twentieth century jurispru-
dence. In Mosler, the same New York court reiterated its previous holding 
in Weeks by refusing to apportion liquidated damages.62 However, the court 
left open the possibility of apportionment when expressly stated within the 
contract.63 
  
on the delay by the contractee whereas another may be to divide them more traditionally 
based on the exact number of days of delay attributable to each party. See 2 STEVEN G.M. 
STEIN, CONSTRUCTION LAW ¶ 6.10[3], at 6-41 to -42 (Lexis Nexis Matthew Bender 2010). 
 57. See United States v. United Eng’g & Constructing Co., 234 U.S. 236 (1914); United 
States v. Kanter, 137 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1943); San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 496 F. 
Supp. 1337 (E.D. Ark. 1980), aff’d, 658 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1981); Glassman Constr. Co. v. 
Md. City Plaza, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Md. 1974); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Pasadena 
City Junior Coll. Dist. of L.A. Cnty., 379 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1963); State ex rel. Smith v. Jack B. 
Parson Constr. 456 P.2d 762 (Idaho 1969); City of Houma v. C-Well Ltd., 515 So. 2d 646 
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Peabody N.E., Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 689 N.E.2d 774 (Mass. 
1998); Intertherm, Inc. v. Structural Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1974); Haggerty v. 
Selsco, 534 P.2d 874 (Mont. 1975); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. DiDonato, 453 A.2d 559 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 493 N.E.2d 
905 (N.Y. 1986); L.A. Reynolds Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 155 S.E.2d 473 (N.C. 
1967); Lee Turzillo Contracting Co. v. Frank Messer & Sons, Inc., 261 N.E.2d 675 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1969); V.L. Nicholson Co. v. Transcon Inv. & Fin. Ltd., 595 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1980); 
Shintech, Inc. v. Grp. Constructors, Inc., 688 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Higgins v. 
City of Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192 (Utah 1981). 
 58. Weeks v. Little, 89 N.Y. 566 (1882). 
 59. Id. at 569–70. 
 60. Id. at 570. 
 61. Mosler Safe Co. v. Maiden Lane Safe Deposit Co., 93 N.E. 81 (N.Y. 1910). 
 62. Id. at 82–84. 
 63. Specifically, the court stated, 
 
It was competent for the parties, anticipating mutations of mind and conditions, 
to have provided against forfeiture of the right to liquidated damages by further 
agreeing that . . . if the contractor was delayed in his work in certain specified 
events, or by causes specified. With such a provision, the obligation to pay liqui-
dated damages might be preserved and its commencement deferred to a substi-
tuted date. Without such a provision, where, by the mutual fault of the parties, 
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Unlike the traditional view, the modern view supports apportioning 
liquidated damages for mutual delay in construction contracts. Some juris-
dictions have flatly rejected the traditional view.64 In E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. 
Manhattan Construction Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded 
that Alabama courts would permit apportionment by using the Mosler 
court’s policy justifications against the application of the no-apportionment 
rule: “The opposing rule is an old one whose underlying policies do not re-
main in full force.”65 In between the two extremes lies a third approach. This 
approach enforces a liquidated damage provision if a court is able to deter-
mine a basis for apportionment.66 
III. PROBLEMS 
Courts rejecting the apportionment rule must deal with numerous prob-
lems that may arise as a result of that rejection. Some of those problems may 
stem from inherent problems in justifying the application of the no-
apportionment rule rather than the repercussions of applying the rule itself. 
Three primary problems that courts rejecting apportionment face include 
contravening public policy of the forum state, conflicting with the freedom 
of contract, and hampering judicial efficiency. 
 
  
the contractor’s original obligation has been put alend to, how could he come 
under a new obligation to pay the liquidated damages from some subsequent 
date? Such an obligation could not be renewed except by some express agree-
ment. 
 
Id. at 83–84 (emphasis added). 
 64. See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1038 (5th Cir. 
1977); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Butte-Meade Sanitary Water Dist., 500 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 
1980). 
 65. E.C. Ernst, Inc., 551 F.2d at 1038. The court continued on to say, “[G]iven the in-
creasing complexity of contractual relationships, liquidated damage provisions have obtained 
firm judicial and legislative support.” Id. at 1039. 
 66. See United States ex rel. Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc. v. B.R. Abbot Constr. Co., 466 
F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1972); Sw. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); 
Nomellini Constr. Co. v. California ex rel Dep’t of Water Res., 96 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Ct. App. 
1971); Wallis v. Inhabitants of Wenham, 90 N.E. 396 (Mass. 1910); Bedford-Carthage Stone 
Co. v. Ramey, 34 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Alcan Elec. & Eng’g Co. v. Samaritan 
Hosp., 109 Wash. App. 1072 (2002) (unpublished opinion); Brashear v. Richardson Constr., 
Inc., 10 P.3d 1115 (Wyo. 2000); Keith v. Burzynski, 621 P.2d 247 (Wyo. 1980). 
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A. Public Policy 
The public policy of a state is found in its constitution, statutes, and 
case law.67 Revised Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code exemplifies 
the policy goal of achieving equitable results by apportioning loss between 
parties.68 Additionally, comparative fault statutes reflect a policy goal of 
trying to achieve an equitable result by eliminating the “‘all or nothing’ 
rule[] of recovery . . . [of] contributory negligence” and instead apportioning 
fault by each party’s own degree of liability.69 States that have codified Re-
vised Article 3 or comparative fault laws express a public policy that is at 
odds with a rule against apportioning liquidated damages. But because the 
Uniform Commercial Code is essentially a subset of contract law, bearing a 
closer relationship to liquidated damage law, the policy exemplified by Re-
vised Article 3 will be discussed first. 
1. Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
Negotiable instruments are specialized or formal types of contracts.70 
Specific types of negotiable instruments include checks, notes, and bank 
drafts.71 The drafters of the original Article 3 set out laws to govern transac-
tions involving negotiable instruments.72 
When the original Article 3 was promulgated in 1952, it was based 
upon a paper payment system.73 Around that time, approximately seven bil-
lion checks were processed annually.74 By the late 1980s, the volume in-
creased to forty-eight billion annually.75 The American Law Institute revised 
Article 3 in 1990 to accommodate changing business practices and modern 
technologies, as well as to address problems with lack of clarity and cer-
tainty that resulted from an evolving business landscape.76 The drafters 
  
 67. See Vincent v. Prudential Ins. Brokerage, 333 Ark. 414, 417–18, 970 S.W.2d 215, 
217 (1998) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 
(1991)). 
 68. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 69. See Michael B. Gallub, Note, A Compromise Between Mitigation and Comparative 
Fault?: A Critical Assessment of the Seat Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 319, 334 (1986). 
 70. 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 6, § 2.21, at 224; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 6. 
 71. U.C.C. § 3-104 (12th ed. 1990); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1136. 
 72. See U.C.C., supra note 71, § 3-102.  
 73. Id. art. 3 Prefatory Note, at 325. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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sought to benefit public interest by attempting to reduce litigation involving 
negotiable instruments.77 
The drafters revised sections 3-404 through 3-406 so that fault could be 
allocated based on each party’s respective fault.78 Generally, in instances of 
fraud involving negotiable instruments, “the person bearing the loss may 
recover from the person failing to exercise ordinary care to the extent the 
failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.”79 Prior to the 1990 
revision, original Article 3 did not allocate fault.80 In addition to the text 
itself, the states that adopted revised Article 3 also adopted the policy behind 
those revisions—courts should allocate fault when multiple parties are re-
sponsible for breaking a contract. 
2. Comparative Fault 
Traditionally, tort and contract law are considered completely distinct 
bodies of substantive law. Some would say blending principles from tort 
into contract, or vice versa, is impossible based on the traditional premise 
alone.81 Today, however, courts consistently cross historical boundaries be-
tween the bodies of law, blurring lines that were once clearly defined. For 
instance, a plaintiff’s own negligence can substantially impact damages re-
coverable for breach of contract.82 A second application of tort principles to 
contract law is courts allowing emotional distress claims to be considered 
contemporaneously with damages for breach.83 Yet another is when fraud 
induces breach of contract and courts award punitive damages.84 Although 
many critics will continue to resist the application of tort principles to con-
tract law, evidence of modern American courts applying such principles cuts 
away at that resistance. 
  
 77. Id. at 328. “By clarification of troublesome issues, and by the provisions of Sections 
3-404 through 3-406[,] which reform rules for allocation of loss from forgeries and altera-
tions, the Revision should significantly reduce litigation.” Id. 
 78. See U.C.C., supra note 71, §§ 3-404 to -406. 
 79. Id. § 3-404(d) (emphasis added). Slightly different language is used in section 3-406: 
“[T]he loss is allocated between the person precluded and the person asserting the preclusion 
according to the extent to which the failure of each to exercise ordinary care contributed to 
the loss.” Id. § 3-406(b) (emphasis added). 
 80. See id. app. VII, §§ 3-404 to -406, at 1231–42. 
 81. See Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 101–02 (Minn. 1983). 
 82. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 913 (1989). 
 83. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991); see also Salka 
v. Dean Homes of Beverly Hills, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (Ct. App. 1993), superseded by 
864 P.2d 1037 (Cal. 1993). 
 84. Edens v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 858 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988); Welborn v. 
Dixon, 49 S.E. 232 (S.C. 1904) (representing one of the earliest applications of punitive 
damages for breach of contract). 
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The concept of negligence first appeared in the early nineteenth cen-
tury.85 This relatively recent addition of a means of establishing liability in 
tort took hundreds of years to develop, the major hurdle being the unwill-
ingness of old English courts to depart from the intentional-unintentional 
standard.86 The unwillingness eroded over time.87 
Once the doctrine of negligence became established as more than a 
passing fad, common law defenses to such claims began to arise. In Butter-
field v. Forrester,88 a man riding his horse on a public road collided with a 
pole that had been left there by another.89 The rider sustained significant 
injuries and brought suit against the man who left the pole in the road.90 At 
the end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury, “[I]f a person riding with 
reasonable and ordinary care could have seen and avoided the obstruction; 
and if . . . the plaintiff was riding along the street extremely hard, and with-
out ordinary care, [you] should find a verdict for the defendant.”91 After the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.92 On 
appeal, Lord Ellenborough authored the unanimous affirming opinion of the 
court that would become known as the first exposition of the concept of 
contributory negligence in modern era tort law: “One person being in fault 
will not dispense with another’s using ordinary care for himself. Two things 
must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of 
the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the 
plaintiff.”93 
Contributory negligence quickly gained enduring popularity in the 
United States.94 However, strict application yielding harsh results chipped 
away at the traditional contributory negligence doctrine, which barred all 
claims for any fault.95 The next chapter in this era gave rise to limitations 
like last clear chance and assumption of risk.96 This law evolved with the 
help of railroad cases.97 The deep pockets of railroads made them vulnerable 
  
 85. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 160–
61 (5th ed. 1984). 
 86. See Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
189 (1950). 
 87. “Action upon the case for negligence” and “case for negligence” became common 
expressions in mid-eighteenth century cases. See, e.g., Aston v. Heaven, (1797) 170 Eng. 
Rep. 445 (C.P.) 446; 2 Esp. 533, 535. 
 88. Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.); 11 East 60. 
 89. Id. at 926; 11 East at 60. 
 90. Id.; 11 East at 60. 
 91. Id. at 927; 11 East at 60. 
 92. See id. at 926–27; 11 East at 60–61. 
 93. Id. at 927; 11 East at 61. 
 94. HENRY WOODS & BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:4 (3d ed. 1996). 
 95. See, e.g., Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co., 21 A. 924 (Conn. 1890). 
 96. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 94, §§ 1:6–1:8, at 9–13. 
 97. See, e.g., Herbert v. S. Pac. Co., 53 P. 651 (Cal. 1898). 
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to sympathetic juries in personal injury actions; applying the rigid doctrine 
would oftentimes require courts to overturn jury verdicts for plaintiffs.98 
This gave rise to Congress’s codification of a comparative fault statute in 
1908.99 
Early, or pure, forms of comparative fault allowed plaintiffs to recover 
from negligent tortfeasors, regardless of their own degree of negligence.100 
Eventually, this pure form developed into what is now commonly known as 
modified comparative fault.101 Under this system, a plaintiff can only re-
cover when his level of negligence is less than the defendant’s.102 Today, all 
but four states have adopted some type of comparative fault doctrine, evi-
dencing the public preference for equitable results.103 
Forty-six states recognize the comparative fault doctrine.104 For those 
states, the idea that inadvertent fault, no matter how little, can preclude just 
recovery for an aggrieved party is gone. Everyone can recover their fair 
share; that is, fault can be apportioned to achieve the most equitable result 
for all involved. 
B. Freedom of Contract 
“There is no reason why parties competent to contract may not agree 
that certain elements of damage difficult to estimate shall be covered by a 
provision for liquidated damages and that other elements shall be ascer-
tained in the usual manner.”105 Recognizing that freedom of contract repre-
sents a pillar of contract remedies,106 judicial encouragement of that princi-
ple has held a hallowed status throughout American legal history.107 With 
respect to liquidated damages, this status has resulted in widespread en-
forcement of such provisions, so long as they were not deemed to be a pen-
alty.108 “The [judiciary’s] emphasis on the parties’ freedom of contract often 
  
 98. Id. 
 99. See 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30304 (2006)). 
 100. See Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: 
Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 245–50 (1990). Mississippi was one of two 
southern states that pioneered comparative fault, adopting a pure comparative fault statute in 
1910. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (Supp. 2011). 
 101. See Mutter, supra note 100, at 245–50. 
 102. See id. 
 103. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 94, § 1:11, at 19–25. 
 104. Id. 
 105. J.E. Hathaway & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 460, 464 (1919). 
 106. Larry A. Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated 
Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 639 (2001). 
 107. Susan V. Ferris, Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 862, 863 (1982). 
 108. Id. 
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resulted in upholding liquidated damage clauses where little or no damage 
actually occurred.”109 
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,110 the Supreme Court upheld a 
liquidated damages clause on the basis of freedom of contract. Pursuant to a 
wartime contract, Bethlehem Steel agreed to manufacture and sell gun car-
riages to the United States over a limited amount of time.111 Since the gun 
carriages were vital to aid the government in its war efforts, the parties con-
tracted to give effect to a liquidated damage provision.112 Despite the war’s 
end, the government sought to enforce the liquidated damage clause when 
Bethlehem Steel failed to deliver the guns on time.113 
The Supreme Court examined the government’s and Bethlehem Steel’s 
intent at the time of contracting and determined that the clause was a fair 
estimate of the harm that might have resulted from the failure to deliver in a 
timely manner.114 Accordingly, the Court held that the clause was valid and 
enforceable despite the lack of actual damage.115 This holding evidenced the 
importance of freedom to contract.  
Despite the Supreme Court’s enforcement of liquidated damage provi-
sions, many other state courts continued to express hostility towards those 
provisions during the early twentieth century. Most of the hostility stemmed 
from a disparity in contracting parties’ bargaining power.116 Powerful parties 
often abused that imbalance to their advantage.117 But as contract law con-
tinued to develop, obligations of good faith and fair dealing became facets 
of American common law jurisprudence.118 With these doctrines as the 
backdrop of modern contract law, critics no longer need to be overly con-
cerned with zealously protecting the rights of the vulnerable when consider-
ing whether to apportion liquidated damages. Courts may still address infir-
mity in a party’s bargaining power when choosing to enforce a liquidated 
damage provision; however, once that provision passes judicial muster, re-
fusing to apportion those damages where mutual fault is encountered con-
flicts with the freedom of contract. 
  
 109. Id. at 864 (citing Ellicott Mach. Co. v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 232 (1908); Byron 
Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665, 667 (S.D. Cal. 1940)). 
 110. 205 U.S. 105 (1907). 
 111. Id. at 119. 
 112. Id. at 119–20. 
 113. See id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 121–22. 
 116. See 11 PERILLO, supra note 21, § 58.3, at 402–03. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 370 (1989). 
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C. Judicial Efficiency 
Numerous judicial justifications support the apportionment rule of liq-
uidated damages, including preserving valuable judicial resources: 
The modern trend is to look with candor, if not with favor, upon a con-
tract provision for liquidated damages when entered into deliberately be-
tween parties who have equality of opportunity for understanding and in-
sisting upon their rights, since an amicable adjustment in advance of dif-
ficult issues saves the time of courts, juries, parties, and witnesses and 
reduces the delay, uncertainty, and expense of litigation.119 
These notions of judicial efficiency are further supported by the no-
apportionment rule’s already existing effects. “[C]ourts have held that the 
rule against apportionment bars only the owner’s right to rely upon a liqui-
dated damage provision, but does not prevent the owner from proving and 
recovering actual damages resulting from contractor-caused delays.”120 So, 
the courts rejecting apportionment still have to endure the tedious, lengthy, 
and costly process of parties proving actual damages anyway. 
The idea that determining actual damages is somehow easier than ap-
portioning liability is a fiction. In the construction context, the sheer number 
of parties that may affect timely performance—owner, architect, engineer, 
government regulators, permitting agencies, prime and subcontractors, sup-
pliers, etc.—shows the inadequacy of a rule that refuses to apportion fault. 
As difficult as it may be to apportion delay, the time and expense of litiga-
tion justifies courts’ attempts to do so. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Arkansas courts should adopt the apportionment rule of liquidated 
damages, especially when dealing with mutual delay in construction litiga-
tion, to remedy the potential problems they face as a result of the current 
state of the law. What many practitioners consider to be the seminal Arkan-
sas case that stands for the rule against apportionment is non-binding federal 
authority.121 Furthermore, the analysis that was used to arrive at that conclu-
sion is flawed—the legal bases are infirm.122 
  
 119. Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 99 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Minn. 1959) (citing Wise v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 361 (1919); Meuwissen v. H.E. Westerman Lumber Co., 16 N.W.2d 546 
(Minn. 1944); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 339 cmt. c (1932)).  
 120. See 2 STEIN, supra note 56, ¶ 6.10[3], at 6-42; see also supra Part III.A.1. 
 121. See San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 496 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Ark. 1980), 
aff’d, 658 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 122. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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Arkansas courts can rest assured that adopting the apportionment rule 
is supported by ample case law from other jurisdictions that follow the mod-
ern view of apportionment.123 Furthermore, Arkansas public policy supports 
apportionment. The following case analysis demonstrates the suitability of 
the doctrine in Arkansas law. 
A. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. 
On June 19, 1967, the United States government entered into a contract 
with Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (“Missouri Pacific”) to modify the 
Benzal Bridge.124 Pursuant to the terms of that contract, Missouri Pacific 
issued invitations to bid on the construction project to numerous contractors, 
and ultimately accepted San Ore-Gardner’s (S.O.G.) bid on November 5, 
1968.125 
The Missouri Pacific/S.O.G. contract called for separating construction 
into three separate stages.126 Two new piers were to be constructed during 
the substructure stage, a portion of the existing bridge was to be replaced 
during the changeover stage, and final adjustments to the replacement sec-
tion of the bridge along with removal of an old pier were to be completed 
during the superstructure phase.127 Among other material terms, “[t]he con-
tract contained . . . a provision for liquidated damages of $600 per day if 
performance of the contract was not completed within the time period speci-
fied.”128 
Originally, the term for completion was set at 660 days.129 Later, it was 
extended to 1122 days—equating to a completion date of March 5, 1972.130 
S.O.G. actually completed the bridge modifications on July 18, 1974—over 
two years beyond the contractual deadline.131 
  
 123. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 124. San Ore-Gardner, 496 F. Supp. at 1339. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1340–41. 
 127. Id. The existing bridge was one that had a central portion that would rotate ninety 
degrees to allow boat traffic to pass. Delta Heritage Trail: Arkansas State Parks, ARK. DEP’T 
OF PARKS & TOURISM, http://www.arkansasstateparks.com/photo-gallery (select “Delta Heri-
tage Trail State Park” from drop-down list) (last visited, Apr. 4, 2013) (though not the Benzal 
Bridge, this bridge is a swing bridge, rotating on the central pier pictured). That rotating 
portion was to be replaced with a section that would elevate instead. San Ore-Gardner, 496 
F. Supp. at 1341; see also Pat Rawls, Capture Arkansas Photo Contest, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (July 3, 2010, 8:21 AM), http://www.capturearkansas.com/photos/53029 (recent 
photograph of Benzal Bridge). 
 128. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 658 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 129. San Ore-Gardner, 496 F. Supp. at 1344. 
 130. Id. 
 131. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner, 658 F.2d at 564. 
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The reasons for the two-plus year delay were not attributable to any 
single act or omission by one party. However, the significant sources of 
delay were easily ascertainable. S.O.G. admitted to a year’s delay in com-
pleting the substructure stage alone, and evidence also suggests that it 
probably was responsible for more.132 But Missouri Pacific was not without 
fault. The district court found that Missouri Pacific offered “[n]o satisfactory 
explanation . . . for its failure to promptly transmit” reports that S.O.G. sub-
mitted for approval to the Army Corps of Engineers.133 Despite contributing 
to the delay, the proportion for which Missouri Pacific was responsible was 
far less than S.O.G.’s fault.134 
As the construction process came to a close, Missouri Pacific retained 
funds that were due to S.O.G. because of S.O.G.’s delay and defective 
work.135 Additionally, $70,000 was withheld “for noise in the bearings of the 
lift mechanism” of the new railroad bridge.136 These and other difficulties 
led to litigation.137 
Although S.O.G. alleged multiple claims against Missouri Pacific,138 at 
the crux of the parties’ dispute was whether the liquidated damage provision 
of the contract was enforceable.139 In June 1980, after a week-long trial in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Judge 
Elsijane Trimble Roy concluded “that both sides were at fault to some ex-
tent.”140 
After a lengthy and detailed discussion of the facts, Judge Roy held 
that the liquidated damage provision of the contract was unenforceable, not 
because both parties were at fault, but because the $600 per day figure “was 
not the subject of negotiation” and Missouri Pacific offered no “rational 
  
 132. San Ore-Gardner, 496 F. Supp. at 1346. 
 133. Id. at 1347. S.O.G. “discovered that [Missouri Pacific] had not mailed the . . . report 
to the Corps of Engineers until . . . over three months after receipt from S.O.G.” S.O.G.-San 
Ore-Gardner, 658 F.2d at 568–69. This left S.O.G. at a veritable standstill until the Corps of 
Engineers responded to the forwarded report. See id. 
 134. The district court highlighted several of S.O.G.’s defects that were “clearly reflected 
in the record.” San Ore-Gardner, 496 F. Supp. at 1347–48 (failing to install an adequate 
emergency power system after being directed to do so; failing to address operations of the 
bridge during construction, which were caused by movement of the piers; taking twice the 
time to complete construction of the cofferdams). 
 135. Id. at 1350. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 1339 (S.O.G. filed its amended complaint on January 8, 1975, and Mis-
souri Pacific filed a third party complaint against S.O.G.’s insurer on February 17, 1977). 
 138. Most of these claims could be characterized as breach of contract claims or declara-
tory judgments. See id. at 1340. 
 139. Id. (S.O.G. contended that the provision was unenforceable, while Missouri Pacific 
sought enforcement of the $600 per day clause). 
 140. San Ore-Gardner, 496 F. Supp. at 1340. 
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basis for its choice of [that figure] . . . as damages for delay.”141 Instead of 
stopping there, arguably in dicta, the court delved into an analysis of liqui-
dated damage law: 
Where the party who is seeking to enforce a liquidated damages provi-
sion of a contract is responsible for the failure to perform or has contrib-
uted in part to it, the liquidated damages provision will not be enforced. 
We recognize that some jurisdictions allow apportionment but the better 
rule seems to be that where delays are occasioned by the mutual fault of 
the parties, the Court will not attempt to apportion but will refuse to en-
force the provision for liquidated damages.142 
The court refused to enforce the provision for either party because, in 
its view, doing so would result in an injustice.143 
S.O.G. appealed the “portion of the judgment denying it damages from 
the delay caused by” factors allegedly beyond its control.144 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
holding, but not before it too expounded upon the district court’s discussion 
of Arkansas liquidated damage law.145 
Just as the district court did, the court provided a comprehensive list of 
authorities on both sides of the issue while addressing Missouri Pacific’s 
pro-apportionment argument.146 Unlike the district court, however, the 
Eighth Circuit cited City of Whitehall v. Southern Mechanical Contracting, 
Inc.,147 an Arkansas Court of Appeals opinion issued in 1980, for the propo-
sition that “Arkansas ha[d] apparently retained the rule against apportion-
ment.”148 Recognizing the import of the district court’s decision, the Eighth 
Circuit attempted to clarify that court’s basis of denying apportionment: 
“The district court denied apportionment based more upon the interrelated-
ness of the parties’ delays than upon its reading of Arkansas law.”149 Lend-
ing its support to this apparent foundation of Arkansas law, the court af-
  
 141. Id. at 1348–49. 
 142. Id. at 1349 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The court continued its 
analysis, recognizing that some jurisdictions that allow apportionment apply the rule only 
where “apportionment could feasibly be made.” Id. The court did not cite to any Arkansas 
state court opinions throughout any of this analysis. 
 143. Id. at 1350. The court also awarded S.O.G. the $70,000 payment retained by Mis-
souri Pacific and ordered Missouri Pacific to return all sums wrongfully withheld for 
S.O.G.’s delays. Id. 
 144. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 658 F.2d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 145. Id. at 569–70 (agreeing “that the Railroad should be precluded from recovering the 
liquidated damages for delay of performance”). 
 146. See id. at 570–71. 
 147. 269 Ark. 563, 599 S.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1980). 
 148. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner, 658 F.2d at 571 (emphasis added) (citing City of White-
hall, 269 Ark. at 571, 599 S.W.2d at 435). 
 149. Id. 
2013] ARKANSAS'S LIQUIDATED DAMAGE LAW  407 
firmed not only the district court’s judgment, but also its “conclusion to 
deny apportionment of liquidated damages.”150 
B. All Factors Point Toward Adoption of the Apportionment Rule 
The Eighth Circuit decided S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Missouri Pa-
cific Railroad Co. without any on-point Arkansas authority to support its 
holding.151 In what should have been limited to a clear question and answer 
of whether a liquidated damage provision was an unenforceable penalty,152 
the court affirmed the district court’s holding in its entirety.153 The Eighth 
Circuit’s decision rejected established Arkansas liquidated damage law and 
contradicted the state’s public policy. 
1. The Federal Court’s Dicta Rejecting Apportionment Is Not         
 Supported by Arkansas Law 
In S.O.G.-San-Ore Gardner, the Eighth Circuit’s contention that an 
Arkansas court had “apparently retained the rule against apportionment” is 
unfounded.154 In City of Whitehall v. Southern Mechanical Contracting, Inc., 
a municipality appealed a judgment in favor of a contractor who had 
brought suit against the city for unpaid funds under a construction con-
tract.155 The city, in turn, counter-claimed for liquidated damages.156 Pursu-
ant to the contract, the contractor was to install a new “sewer treatment pond 
and five sewage pump stations.”157 Before construction was completed, the 
city fired the contractor and sought to enforce the liquidated damage provi-
sion after a replacement contractor finished the work.158 After analyzing the 
circumstances of the case, the Arkansas Court of Appeals determined that 
the city could not enforce the liquidated damage provision against the con-
tractor because the city waived its right to do so when it fired the contractor 
before making the construction site available.159 
Nothing in the opinion indicated that the contractor contributed to the 
city’s delay in making the construction site available. The only delays were 
  
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 570–71. 
 152. Obviously, S.O.G. would have prevailed even if the holding was limited to this 
alone. No reasonable argument could be made to show that the clause was not a penalty. 
 153. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner, 658 F.2d at 571. 
 154. Id. (citing City of Whitehall v. S. Mech. Contracting, Inc., 269 Ark. 563, 599 
S.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1980)). 
 155. City of Whitehall, 269 Ark. at 564, 599 S.W.2d at 431. 
 156. Id. at 564–65, 599 S.W.2d at 431. 
 157. Id., 599 S.W.2d at 432. 
 158. Id. at 565–68, 599 S.W.2d at 431–34. 
 159. Id. at 571, 599 S.W.2d at 435. 
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no fault of the contractor—primarily, bad weather and an oil embargo.160 In 
fact, the city was responsible for the very delays it was attributing to the 
contractor.161 Thus, City of Whitehall does not support the Eighth Circuit’s 
contention that Arkansas had adopted the no-apportionment rule. 
2. Apportionment Was and Still Is the Prevailing View 
In its opinion, the S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner district court quickly en-
dorsed the no-apportionment rule and cited numerous cases for support.162 
Arkansas state court cases were missing from this list entirely.163 Neverthe-
less, the court stated that “[w]here the party who is seeking to enforce a liq-
uidated damages provision of a contract is responsible for the failure to per-
form or has contributed [to] part [of] it, the liquidated damages provision 
will not be enforced.”164 But what seemed like a conclusive holding was put 
in doubt by the court’s ensuing discussion of jurisdictions allowing appor-
tionment along with applying facts of the instant case to that model.165 Al-
though the district court could have stopped its analysis after holding that 
the liquidated damage provision could not be enforced because it was a pen-
alty, in the end, the lukewarm dismissal of the apportionment rule followed 
by an analysis of the rule anyway did not completely close the door on this 
issue. 
Any opportunity to salvage the apportionment rule left by the district 
court was completely foreclosed on appeal by the Eighth Circuit. Although 
that court also agreed that the liquidated damage provision was really a pen-
  
 160. Id. at 565–67, 599 S.W.2d at 431–33. 
 161. City of Whitehall, 269 Ark. at 565–67, 599 S.W.2d at 431–33 (among other things, 
instructing the contractor that a pump be moved to another location that had not yet been 
purchased by the city). 
 162. San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 496 F. Supp. 1337, 1349 (E.D. Ark. 1980), 
aff’d, 658 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 163. See id. The court cited to a variety of cases from other jurisdictions, including Peter 
Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Summit Construction Co., 422 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. 
John Kerns Construction Co., 140 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1944); United States v. Kanter, 137 
F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1943); Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Brumbaugh, 168 F. 867 (4th Cir. 1909); 
Investors Thrift Corp. v. Hunt, 387 F. Supp. 517 (W.D. Ark. 1974), aff’d, 511 F.2d 1161 (8th 
Cir. 1975); General Insurance Co. of America v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal. Rptr. 317 
(Ct. App. 1970); Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 114 P.2d 65 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1941); and Smith v. City of Tahlequah, 245 P. 994 (Okla. 1926). Although these cases 
accurately describe the rule against apportionment, they offer no support for the adoption of 
that rule in Arkansas. 
 164. San Ore-Gardner, 496 F. Supp. at 1349 (citing John Kerns Construction Co., 140 
F.2d at 792; Kanter, 137 F.2d at 828). The court continued on to characterize that rule as “the 
better rule.” Id. 
 165. Id. The court concluded that “[t]he construction work and delays of each of the 
parties were so interrelated that it would not be possible for the Court to attempt to break 
down and determine the number of days’ delay for which each party was responsible.” Id. 
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alty and therefore unenforceable, it also decided to weigh in on other argu-
ments—only this time, the court purported to reach a definitive conclusion 
by citing Arkansas case law.166 The court’s holding proposed that Arkansas 
law rejects all forms of apportioning liquidated damages for delay in con-
struction contracts.167 
At the time S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner was decided, adopting the appor-
tionment theory of liquidated damages was the obvious next step to be taken 
in the evolution of the law. The Eighth Circuit minimized apportionment’s 
acceptance by citing to only five jurisdictions that supported the rule.168 To 
accurately capture the rule’s presence across the United States, the court 
could have cited to at least thirteen jurisdictions, if not more, that had recog-
nized the apportionment rule; many of those had been doing so since the 
turn of the century.169 
  
 166. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 658 F.2d 562, 570–71 (8th Cir. 
1981). “Because the Railroad’s failure to timely forward the naval architect’s report to the 
Corps of Engineers contributed to the delay in the changeover, we agree that the Railroad 
should be precluded from recovering the liquidated damages for delay of performance.” Id. at 
570. Unlike the district court’s opinion, this court cited to authorities on both sides of the 
issue. For jurisdictions applying apportionment, the court cited Dallas-Fort Worth Regional 
Airport Board v. Combustion Equipment Associates, Inc., 623 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1980); 
E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Construction Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977), 
reh’g denied, in part, reh’g granted, in part, 559 F.2d 268, cert. denied sub nom. Providence 
Hospital v. Manhattan Construction Co., 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); United States ex rel. Thorleif 
Larsen & Son, Inc. v. B.R. Abbot Construction Co., 466 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1972); Barnard-
Curtiss Co. v. United States ex rel. D.W. Falls Construction Co., 257 F.2d 565 (10th Cir. 
1958); and Brecher v. Laikin, 430 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner, 
658 F.2d at 570–71. For jurisdictions rejecting apportionment, in addition to the cases cited 
by the district court, the court cited United States v. United Engineering & Contracting Co., 
234 U.S. 236 (1914); State ex rel. Smith v. Jack B. Parson Construction, 456 P.2d 762 (Idaho 
1969); Haggerty v. Selsco, 534 P.2d 874 (Mont. 1975); and most importantly, City of White-
hall v. Southern Mechanical Contracting, Inc., 269 Ark. 563, 599 S.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 
1980). S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner, 658 F.2d at 570–71. The court concluded with an attempt to 
clarify the district court’s apparent confusion in Arkansas law: 
 
Arkansas has apparently retained the rule against apportionment. The district 
court denied apportionment based more upon the interrelatedness of the parties’ 
delays than upon its reading of Arkansas law. Both the difficulty in delineation 
of fault and the apparent position of the Arkansas courts support the district 
court’s conclusion to deny apportionment of liquidated damages. 
 
Id. at 571 (citations omitted). 
 167. See S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner, 658 F.2d at 571. 
 168. See id. at 570–71 (including Alabama, Illinois, New Mexico, Texas, and New York). 
 169. See also Sw. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Butte-Meade Sanitary Water Dist., 500 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 1980) (applying 
South Dakota law); Am. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (apply-
ing federal common law); Hebert v. Weil, 39 So. 389 (La. 1905); Wallis v. Inhabitants of 
Wenham, 90 N.E. 396 (Mass. 1910); Jobst v. Hayden Bros., 121 N.W. 957 (Neb. 1909); 
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Among the jurisdictions recognizing apportionment, there are varied 
applications of the rule. The most common approach apportions damages 
when evidence indicating delay and the resultant expenses thereof can be 
clearly divided amongst all the parties involved in the litigation.170 In the 
event a court cannot determine the proportions of responsibility, the provi-
sion will not be enforced. A less common approach hinges on the existence 
of a time extension clause: 
In building contracts, there is often inserted a provision giving the archi-
tect power to certify an extension of time in certain cases, by virtue of 
which the effect of a delay caused by the owner operates merely as an 
extension of the time for performance, and a new time is substituted for 
the old. In that event[,] though the owner causes [the] delay the builder is 
liable in liquidated damages, but the period of delay caused by the owner 
is deducted from the total delay. Unless the contract contains such a pro-
vision[,] the delay due to each party will not generally be apportioned.171 
Other variations introduce good faith prerequisites.172 Despite some of 
the nuanced approaches that some jurisdictions adopt, many still hold that 
“recovery should not be barred in every case by a rule of law that precludes 
examination of evidence.”173 
Since the Eighth Circuit decided S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner in 1981, ad-
ditional jurisdictions have adopted the apportionment rule of liquidated 
damages.174 The Fifth Circuit offered several factors that may have served as 
motivation for both these and previous jurisdictions to adopt the apportion-
ment rule: “[G]iven the increasing complexity of contractual relationships, 
liquidated damage provisions have obtained firm judicial and legislative 
support. . . . Generally, owners do not benefit from delays that they incur.”175 
Arkansas courts should adopt the apportionment rule because it was the pre-
  
Vanderhoof v. Shell, 72 P. 126 (Or. 1903); Pittsburg Iron & Steel Eng’g Co. v. Nat’l Tube-
works Co., 39 A. 76 (Pa. 1898); Williams v. Lewis N. Rosenbaum Co., 106 P. 493 (Wash. 
1910). 
 170. See 2 STEIN, supra note 56, ¶ 6.10[3], at 6-41 to -42. This is the form the district 
court attempted to apply. San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 496 F. Supp. 1337, 1349 
(E.D. Ark. 1980), aff’d, 658 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 171. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 789, at 765–66 (3d ed. 1961) (citations omitted). 
 172. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1026, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977) (stat-
ing that “[a]s long the owner’s own delay is not incurred in in bad faith” apportionment 
would be allowed). Arguably, this is an implicit requirement in all apportionment jurisdic-
tions. 
 173. E.g., id. 
 174. See Airline Constr., Inc. v. Barr, 807 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Brashear v. 
Richardson Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1115 (Wyo. 2000) (extending apportionment rule to cover 
prime-sub contracts). 
 175. E.C. Ernst, Inc., 551 F.2d at 1039. 
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vailing view when the Eighth Circuit affirmed S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. and it is still the prevailing view today. 
3. Arkansas’s Public Policy Supports the Apportionment Rule 
The Arkansas General Assembly adopted revised Article 3 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code in 1991.176 The Act specifically included revisions 
providing for apportionment of fault where more than one party was respon-
sible—a marked change from the previous statute that completely precluded 
apportionment.177 These laws, as originally enacted, continue to exist today. 
Additionally, Revised Article 3 has been adopted in forty-six states and the 
District of Columbia, illustrating the widespread consensus that apportion-
ment is the better rule.178  
Since enactment, courts applying those Arkansas negotiable instrument 
laws have enforced the provisions consistently—once again giving effect to 
the policy of equitable apportionment.179 Any doubt as to whether Arkan-
sas’s public policy supports apportionment in contract actions can be cast 
aside by the Arkansas judiciary’s recognition of those policies for over 
twenty years. 
Apart from Arkansas statutory contract law, the public policy showing 
support for apportionment is evident through statutory tort law. Arkansas is 
one of the forty-six states that recognize the comparative fault doctrine of 
liability for negligence.180 Interestingly, after Georgia, Mississippi, and Wis-
consin, Arkansas was the fourth jurisdiction to adopt comparative fault.181 
Originally, Arkansas adopted the pure form of comparative fault.182 After 
several years of difficulty applying the doctrine, the legislature amended the 
statute to reflect the more popular modified form.183 Since then, the statute 
has been amended and revised several times but has never lost its main pur-
pose—to ensure that all parties are treated as equitably as possible.184 
  
 176. See Act of Mar. 15, 1991, No. 572, 1991 Ark. Acts 572 at sec. 9 (codified at ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 4-3-101 to -119 (Repl. 2001 & Supp. 2011)). 
 177. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-3-404 to -406 (Repl. 2001). 
 178. 2 PETER A. ALCES ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE: 
ANALYSIS AND FORMS § 19:2 (4th ed. 1988). 
 179. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bank of Bentonville, 29 F. Supp. 2d 553 (W.D. 
Ark. 1998); A.C.E., Inc. v. Inland Mortg. Co., 333 Ark. 232, 969 S.W.2d 176 (1998); Union 
Nat’l Bank of Little Rock v. Daneshvar, 33 Ark. App. 171, 803 S.W.2d 567 (1991). 
 180. WOODS & DEERE, supra note 94, § 1:11, at 20–25. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Act of Mar. 14, 1955, No. 191, 1955 Ark. Acts 191 (repealed by Act of Mar. 27, 
1957, No. 296, 1957 Ark. Acts 296). 
 183. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 94, § 1:11, at 19–25 (explaining that through Act of 
Mar. 27, 1957, No. 296, 1957 Ark. Acts 296, the General Assembly adopted the modified 
form). 
 184. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 94, § 1:11, at 19–25. 
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Regardless of Arkansas’s comparative fault statute’s form, it has em-
bodied that equitable principle for over fifty years.185 In 1981—the year the 
Eighth Circuit decided S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Missouri Pacific Rail-
road Co.—the concept had already been recognized for nearly twenty-five 
years.186 The concepts behind comparative fault and apportionment of dam-
ages are so similar, many courts that have chosen to adopt the apportion-
ment rule “are apportioning fault . . . by application of rules of comparative 
[fault].”187 
Rejecting the apportionment rule of liquidated damages is at odds with 
Revised Article 3 and comparative fault’s unhindered acceptance in Arkan-
sas. Based on the clearly established public policy of the state, the federal 
courts should have decided to either abstain from deciding the apportion-
ment issue or, alternatively, endorse apportionment as Arkansas law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In August 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit issued an opinion that marked an end to nearly ten years of litigation 
over the alteration of a bridge spanning the White River near Benzal, Arkan-
sas. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. established 
new precedent that effectively eliminated the possibility of enforcing liqui-
dated damage provisions for delay in Arkansas construction contracts. The 
evidence at trial clearly indicated S.O.G.’s responsibility for a significant 
portion of the delay. However, the court precluded Missouri Pacific from 
enforcing a previously contracted liquidated damage provision because it 
too contributed to the delay, even though its contribution dwarfed in com-
parison to S.O.G.’s.188 
Whether construction involves building the simplest of tract homes or 
the most complicated power generation plant, delay is both a universal con-
cern and an inevitable reality that must be addressed.189 The concept of liq-
uidated damages—as it is known today—has been recognized and discussed 
  
 185. See 1955 Ark. Acts 191. 
 186. See id. 
 187. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1026, 1039 n.34 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 188. The lower court found that Missouri Pacific did not forward a report as quickly as it 
should have; despite S.O.G.’s self-admitted one-year delay, the court refused to allow Mis-
souri Pacific to enforce, ultimately concluding that the three month delay was too “inter-
woven” with S.O.G.’s. S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 658 F.2d 562, 568–69 
(8th Cir. 1981). 
 189. See, e.g., ENERGETICS INC., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, 
CONSTRUCTION CODES AND STANDARDS: AVOIDANCE OF NEW NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
CONSTRUCTION DELAYS (2008). 
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by our courts for over one hundred years.190 Much of the initial discussion 
centered on making a distinction between penalties and damages, ultimately 
resulting in the consensus that unless facially unreasonable, liquidated dam-
age provisions would not be subject to judicial intervention and interpreta-
tion. From that point on, however, various jurisdictions began adding indi-
vidual nuances that evolved into several species of liquidated damage law. 
Nearly fifteen years before the S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Co. decision, a national trend of fault apportionment began devel-
oping that could be applied generally without disrupting existing legal 
precedent.191 This development helped effectuate the contracting parties’ 
intent while addressing inequities that existed in the then current systems. 
Unfortunately, the S.O.G-San Ore-Gardner court chose not to adopt that 
trend. 
The Eighth Circuit—and Arkansas courts applying the S.O.G.-San 
Ore-Gardner holding since—should not have concluded that any act con-
tributing to the failure to meet contractual deadlines, notwithstanding a dis-
proportionate level of corresponding fault, bars parties from enforcing a 
liquidated damage provision within a construction contract. Arkansas courts 
applying a no-apportionment rule to sophisticated commercial parties seek-
ing enforcement of liquidated damage provisions for construction delay con-
travene the public policy of the state, as evidenced by its statutory negotia-
ble instrument and comparative fault laws. Furthermore, the no-
apportionment rule violates the fundamental freedom of contract. Finally, 
failing to apportion will consume valuable judicial resources, hamper effi-
ciency, and increase costs of litigation for all parties involved. 
All is not lost. Although S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner’s no-apportionment 
rule is considered to be Arkansas law, it is not only non-binding precedent 
and mere dicta, but its origins are also infirm. In addition to being able to 
establish law without disturbing any binding authority, Arkansas courts may 
take comfort in the fact that by adopting an apportionment rule, they will be 
joining the modern approach that is supported by Arkansas public policy. 
The point of a liquidated damage provision is to improve certainty by allow-
ing parties to allocate risk. Apportioning agreed-upon damages will give 
effect to the parties’ wishes and avoid needless litigation—significantly re-
ducing the burdens on both the judiciary and parties involved in the con-
struction process. 
  
 190. See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 660–74 (1902) (making a 
distinction between an unenforceable penalty and a liquidated damage provision which the 
parties contemplated while contracting). 
 191. In fact, the Eighth Circuit itself endorsed the newly developed theory in 1965. Sw. 
Eng’g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965). 
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